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Still Blinking at Political Reality in Federal Elections:
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission
The ideal of political equality-that each individual regardless
of his position should have equal opportunity to express his political
views and thereby influence the outcome of federal elections-is an
important right of American citizenship.! When corporate contribu-
tions threatened this ideal in the early part of this century, Congress
initially sought to preserve the integrity of federal elections2 and has
endeavored ever since to ensure individuals equal access to the po-
litical marketplace.3 On the heels of the Watergate revelations of
1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 385 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the rich more
than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of
distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious for-
tune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United
States ....
Id.
2. See Act of Jan. 26, 1907 (Tillman Act), ch. 420,34 Stat. 864 (limiting contributions
made to federal elections candidates by national banks and corporations). The Tillman
Act was a result of Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to minimize the corruptive effects of
large corporate contributions in federal elections. See Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and
the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 53, 60 (1987).
3. For example, in 1910 and 1911, Congress added disclosure requirements for fed-
eral candidates. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (requiring post-election
disclosure of campaign contributions), amended by Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, § 2, 37
Stat. 25, 26-29 (requiring pre-election disclosure). In 1925, Congress passed the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act (the "FCPA"), ch. 368, tit. 3, § 301, 43 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1925), re-
pealed by Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20
(1972), which limited expenditures of congressional and senatorial candidates, required
itemized reports of all contributions and expenditures received by candidates, and
strengthened existing limits on corporate spending. The FCPA consolidated previous elec-
tion law under one act and was more a "general housekeeping measure" than it was a
significant change from existing legislation. See 1 ROBERT F. BAUER & DORIS M.
KAFKA, UNITED STATES FEDERAL ELECTION LAW: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PO-
LITICAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND PARTICIPATION, booklet 2, at 4 (1984). The Hatch
Act and the Hatch Act Amendments prohibited the political activities of federal and state
employees, restricted categories of contributors, and limited the amount individuals in
certain circumstances could contribute to federal campaigns. See Act of Aug. 2, 1939
(Hatch Act), ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified at scattered sections of 5 & 18 U.S.C. (1994)),
amended by Act of July 19, 1940 (Hatch Act Amendments), ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767. The
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 562-74 (1971)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-42 (1994)), provided for the public financing of
presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The Federal Election Campaign Act of
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corrupt campaign practices, Congress attempted to stem corruption's
detrimental effects upon the public's confidence in the electoral
process by enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974 (the "FECA Amendments").4 In 1976, in Buckley v.
Valeo,5 the Supreme Court reviewed the FECA Amendments in light
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55
(1994)), replaced the FCPA, placing limits on contributions by a candidate to his own
campaign, capping the amounts a candidate could spend on advertising, and broadening
disclosure requirements. For a brief synopsis of the legislative history of federal elections
laws, see 1 BAUER & KAFKA, supra, booklet 2, at 2-7; Nahra, supra note 2, at 58-67. See
generally ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 1-51 (1988) (discussing the history of federal cam-
paign regulations from 1904 to Watergate); GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE
MONEY TREE? AMERICAN CAMPAIGN FINANCING PRACTICES FROM 1789 TO THE
PRESENT 24-122 (1973) (examining in practical terms the role money plays in politics, and
the history and nature of campaign finance regulations and practices).
4. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, & 47 U.S.C. (1994)). The FECA
Amendments of 1974 were the most comprehensive federal election legislation in the his-
tory of the United States. See S. REP. NO. 93-689, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.S.C.A.N. 5587, 5587 (describing the FECA Amendments as "far-reaching"); Marlene
Arnold Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 323, 323 (characterizing the FECA
Amendments as the most comprehensive campaign reforms in history); Daniel D. Polsby,
Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 2 ("[T]he
FECA amendments are the most ambitious and thoroughgoing reforms of the election
process ever enacted by Congress." (footnote omitted)). The FECA Amendments of
1974, inter alia, provided for the creation of a Federal Election Commission, provided lim-
its on both contributions and expenditures, created public financing subsidies for
presidential candidates, and included stricter disclosure requirements. See Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994); HERBERT E.
ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 274-
75 (1976) (listing the provisions of the FECA Amendments); Joel L. Fleishman, The 1974
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments: The Shortcomings of Good Intentions, 1975
DUKE L.J. 851, 854-62.
The FECA Amendments were enacted largely in response to the improprieties of
Richard Nixon's 1972 election campaign. See Jo Freeman, Political Party Contributions
and Expenditures Under the Federal Election Campaign Act: Anomalies and Unfinished
Business, 4 PACE L. REV. 267, 267 (1984) (noting that abuses uncovered during the Wa-
tergate hearings led to the FECA Amendments); Nahra, supra note 2, at 66 ("As a result
of the tremors Watergate sent throughout the country, the final form of the 1974 amend-
ments tilted toward a more extensive regulation of the campaign structures."); see also S.
REP. NO. 93-689, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 5588 (listing problems of
the then-current system). One commentator has suggested that the FECA Amendments
are "in a sense a major legacy of [Nixon's] administration. Just as the growing malaise and
restlessness of the electorate through the Vietnam period made sweeping reform of fed-
eral elections possible, Watergate and its extraordinary transpirations made it necessary."
Polsby, supra, at 1. See generally RALPH K. WINTER, WATERGATE AND THE LAW:
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 5-52 (1974) (examining the impact of
Watergate on campaign financing and evaluating the legitimacy of present and proposed
reform legislation).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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of the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and association.
However, the Court's piecemeal approach, upholding some provi-
sions of the legislation and striking down others, has undermined
Congress's attempt to provide a balance between the potential evils
of corruption and protection of First Amendment rights.7 Despite
recognizing Congress's power to regulate federal elections and the
government's vital interest in preventing both the appearance and
reality of corruption in campaigns, the Court's decision prevented
Congress from using its power 9 to achieve either end.'0
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission," the Supreme Court was presented with an
opportunity to reexamine its election law jurisprudence and address
the validity of campaign finance laws in the context of political party
6. See id. at 23.
7. See Nabra, supra note 2, at 76; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 254 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Court's decision failed "to give
adequate consideration to the nature of this legislation"). In Buckley, the Court upheld
limits on the amount of money a person could contribute to a candidate's campaign, but
struck down limits on the amount of money a person could spend independently. See id. at
26, 45; infra notes 106-17 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley and the differences
between contributions and expenditures). The Court asserted that the spending of money
is more analogous to speech than to conduct, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15-17, and concluded
that expenditure limits violated the First Amendment's freedom of speech because they
restrained a person's ability to advocate political views, see id. at 48.
According to Nahra, the Buckley decision "wins no prize for either logic or foresight"
and the Court failed to thoroughly consider "the impact of its actions on the financing
structure set up by Congress." Nahra, supra note 2, at 55. Polsby characterized the deci-
sion as a political one, not resting on a "single, coherent view of free speech"; the Court
sought to find "a middle way between the extremes of the FECA amendments and no elec-
tion reform at all." Polsby, supra note 4, at 17; see also Lillian R. BeVier, Money and
Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 1045, 1058 (1985) (discussing the difficulty the Court had in drawing the line be-
tween conduct and speech).
& See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-27,45.
9. Congress is empowered to regulate federal elections under Article IV of the Con-
stitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places, and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Leg-
islature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations
10. The Supreme Court eviscerated the effect of the FECA Amendments by creating
loopholes through which individuals, corporations, and other organizations could circum-
vent campaign spending limits. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 510 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); id. at 520
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). For example, in Buckley Justice White argued that it is illogical to limit
contributions while allowing a person to spend independently unlimited sums of money on
a candidate's behalf. See id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11. 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
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spending. In a plurality opinion, the Court held that § 441a(d)(3) of
FECA, a provision limiting political party expenditures, did not
apply to radio advertisements purchased by the Colorado Republi-
can Federal Campaign Committee ("CRFCC") because those
expenditures were not made in coordination with a federal candi-
date. 4 The plurality declined to reach the broader question of
whether the provision's limit on coordinated expenditures was un-
constitutional on its face. 5 However, the concurring and dissenting
Justices intensely debated the issue.16 Thus, Colorado Republican is
significant not merely because a majority of Justices agreed that
FECA does not and cannot restrict a political party's right to spend
independently. 7 Rather, the importance of Colorado Republican is
its representation of the Court's dissatisfaction with the Buckley
framework and its indication that political party contribution and
expenditure limits infringe the First Amendment rights of speech and
association too severely to stand.'
An understanding of the opinions in Colorado Republican is fa-
cilitated by familiarity with the structure and terms of campaign
finance laws. Therefore, this Note first briefly discusses the basic
framework of the campaign finance laws, concentrating on private
financing and the distinctions between contributions and expendi-
tures.' 9 The Note next discusses the facts of Colorado Republican,
the lower court decisions, and the various opinions of the Supreme
Court Justices.20 The Note then reviews the Supreme Court's analy-
sis of FECA in light of the First Amendment, beginning with its
treatment of political speech in federal elections.2' Thereafter, the
Note examines the Court's views regarding the societal value of
speech, focusing especially on the perceived role of political parties
12. Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, use of "FECA" in this Note will refer to
FECA of 1971 as amended and currently codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994).
13. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (quoting statutory definitions of
"contributions," "independent expenditures," and "coordinated expenditures").
14. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2312.
15. See id. at 2320-21.
16. See id. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part);
id. at 2323 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 2332
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. See id. at 2316.
18. See infra notes 178-253 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 37-96 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 97-141 and accompanying text.
1997] 1851
1852 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
22in disseminating political ideals. After briefly examining the plu-
rality's resolution of the statutory issue, 23 the Note examines the
legitimacy of the Court's distinction between contributions and ex-
penditures, the impact of that distinction upon national political
parties, and whether the campaign finance laws as they exist or may
come to exist have any practical effect.
24
Campaign finance law permits a candidate for federal office to
raise funds either through public or private financing.25 A concep-
tual understanding of private financing, albeit a simplistic one, can
be achieved by addressing three fundamental questions: Who is enti-
tled to spend money in federal elections? In what ways are they
entitled to spend? How much are they entitled to spend? Presently,
FECA allows any person or multicandidate political committee16 to
27privately finance a candidate's election campaign. A person or
multicandidate political committee may spend that money by making
a campaign contribution, a campaign expenditure, or both.2s Expen-
22. See infra notes 142-68 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 183-258 and accompanying text.
25. The laws governing public campaign finance are beyond the scope of this Note and
will not be discussed. For an overview of the public financing scheme, see generally 1
BAUER & KAFKA, supra note 3, booklet 5, at 19-53. One should be aware, however, that
a candidate's acceptance of public financing is essentially contingent on the candidate's
refusal to finance his campaign with private funds. See 26 U.S.C. § 9003(b)(2) (1994).
Although designed to eliminate the perceived evils of private financing, in practice, private
funds may still be used to support a candidate's election under a primarily public financing
scheme. See 1 BAUER & KAFKA, supra note 3, booklet 5, at 44-45 (discussing a FECA
provision that, in some circumstances, allows national, state, and local committees to ex-
pend funds on behalf of presidential and vice-presidential candidates).
26. FECA broadly defines the word "person" as "an individual, partnership, commit-
tee, association, corporation, labor organization, or any other organization or group of
persons." 2 U.S.C. § 431(11) (1994). FECA defines "multicandidate political committee"
as a registered political committee "which has received contributions from more than 50
persons, and, except for any State political party organization, has made contributions to 5
or more candidates for Federal office." Id. § 441a(a)(4). A political committee is estab-
lished when an organization either receives contributions exceeding $1,000 or makes
expenditures in excess of that amount. See id. § 431(4)(A). A corporation cannot spend
corporate funds in connection with a candidate's election, but may establish a separate
segregated fund, commonly referred to as a "political action committee" ("PAC"). See id.
§ 441b(b)(2)(C). PACs automatically qualify as political committees regardless of
whether they meet the multicandidate political committee threshold requirements. See id.
§ 431(4)(B). Hereinafter, this Note will use "persons," "multicandidate political commit-
tees," "political committees," and "PACs" in a manner consistent with these definitions.
27. See id. § 441a.
28. FECA defines the term "contribution" as
any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value
made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office;
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ditures may be either independent or coordinated; however, coor-
dinated expenditures-those made in "cooperation, consultation, or
concert" with a candidate-are considered contributions and are
limited as such . Persons or multicandidate political committees are
prohibited from making direct contributions that exceed specified
annual and aggregate limits.3 However, limits initially placed by
or ... the payment by any person of compensation for the personal services of
another person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for
any purpose.
Id. § 431(8)(A). FECA defines the term "expenditure" as "any purchase, payment, distri-
bution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person
for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Id. § 431(9)(A)(i). FECA
expressly excludes certain activities and services from being considered as either contribu-
tions or expenditures. See id. §§ 431(8)(B), 431(9)(B).
29. An "independent expenditure" is
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation
with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and
which is not made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candi-
date, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate.
Id. § 431(17). The phrase "clearly identified" means that "the name of the candidate ap-
pears; ... a photograph or drawing of the candidate appears; or ... the identity of the
candidate is apparent by unambiguous reference." Id. § 431(18). The Supreme Court has
defined political spending "in connection with" a candidate as "express advocacy," but
only in the context of corporate campaign spending. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Mas-
sachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 248-50 (1986). The Colorado district court
and the Tenth Circuit disagreed as to whether that same definition applied to provisions
limiting political party spending. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
30. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) ("[E]xpenditures made by any person in coopera-
tion, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his
authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to
such candidate.").
31. FECA states:
(a) Dollar limits on contributions.
(1) No person shall make contributions-
(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with re-
spect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed
$1,000;
(B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national
political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any
candidate, in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $20,000;
or
(C) to any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the
aggregate, exceed $5,000.
(2) No multicandidate political committee shall make contributions-
(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with re-
spect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed
$5,000;
(B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national
political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any
candidate, in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $15,000;
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FECA on independent expenditures were held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo32 as a violation of the First
33Amendment rights of free speech and association. To date, a per-
son or multicandidate political committee is allowed to make
unlimited independent expenditures.34
National and state committees of political parties may also make
contributions and expenditures.35 However, those committees are
subject to a special provision (the "party expenditure provision")
that precludes them from making an expenditure "in connection with
the general election campaign of a candidate ... which exceeds
[either] ... 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the
State... or $20,000. ,36 In Colorado Republican, the constitutionality
of this provision was challenged. The resolution of the issue in-
volved discerning the nature of political parties as it relates to their
First Amendment rights. In what ways are they similar to or differ-
ent from other campaign spenders? Do those similarities or
differences, if any, justify or necessitate disparate infringement of a
political party's First Amendment rights?
In January of 1986, the CRFCC purchased radio advertisements
attacking Timothy Wirth, the likely Democratic senatorial candidate
in the fall elections.3 ' The advertisements aired in early April, before
or
(C) to any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the
aggregate, exceed $5,000.
(3) No individual shall make contributions aggregating more than $25,000 in
any calendar year.
Id. § 441a(a).
32. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
33. See id. at 23.
34. See id.
35. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4).
36. Id. § 441a(d)(3)(A).
37. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2314. The text of the advertisements read
as follows:
Paid for by the Colorado Republican State Central Committee.
Here in Colorado we're used to politicians who let you know where they
stand, and I thought we could count on Tim Wirth to do the same. But the last
few weeks have been a real eye-opener. I just saw some ads where Tim Wirth
said he's for a strong defense and a balanced budget. But according to his record,
Tim Wirth voted against every new weapon system in the last five years. And he
voted against the balanced budget amendment.
Tim Wirth has a right to run for the Senate, but he doesn't have a right to
change the facts.
Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp.
1448, 1451 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2309
(1996).
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38the CRFCC had selected a candidate of its own, and four months
39 40prior to the Democratic primary. 9  As required by statute , the
CRFCC filed a report with the Federal Election Commission
("FEC") listing all of its campaign expenditures.41 The expenditure
for the radio advertisements, however, was listed as an operating ex-42
pense. The Colorado Democratic Party filed a complaint with the
FEC, asserting that the CRFCC violated FECA's party expenditure
provision.43 Under the statute, the CRFCC was eligible to spend
$103,248 in the upcoming election;44 however, it had already assigned
that amount to the National Republican Party.45  After settlement
negotiations between the FEC and the CRFCC failed, the FEC initi-
ated a civil action asserting that the CRFCC had violated
§ 441a(d)(3) by exceeding the statutory expenditure limits.46 In re-
sponse, the CRFCC maintained that the statute did not apply
because the radio advertisements were not made "in connection
38. See Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1451.
39. See id.
40. The Act requires that a report be filed with the Federal Election Commission dis-
closing "for any political committee other than an authorized committee ... expenditures
made under § 441a(d) of this title." 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(4)(H)(iv).
41. See Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1451.
42- See id.
43. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2314.
44. A political party's coordinated expenditure limit is the greater of $20,000 times
the Cost of Living Adjustment ("COLA") or two cents times the State Voting Age Popula-
tion ("VAP") times the COLA. See, 22 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N REC. 1, 14 (1996).
The Secretary of Commerce is required by FECA to publish an estimate of the VAP for
each State in the Federal Register. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(e). FECA also requires the Secre-
tary of Labor to publish in the Federal Register, at the beginning of the calendar year, the
percentage difference in the consumer price index for the preceding calendar year and the
calendar year of 1974 (the "base period"). See id. § 441a(c). In 1986, the COLA was
2.181 and Colorado's VAP was 2.367 million. See Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers, United States City Average, 51 Fed. Reg. 5115 (Dep't of Labor 1986)
(announcing that the consumer price index rose 118.1% from the 1974 base period to an
annual average of 218.1% in 1985); Estimates of the Voting Age Population for 1985, 51
Fed. Reg. 10,418 (Dep't of Commerce 1986) (reporting the VAP estimates for all states);
see also, 12 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N REc. 1, 1 (1986) (announcing 1986 coordinated
expenditure limits for all states based on VAPs and a 2.181 COLA). Thus, the CRFCC
was permitted to spend a total of $103,248.50, nearly $60,000 more than allowed under the
alternative formula. See id.
45. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2314. The Supreme Court had earlier ruled
that a state party cannot constitutionally be prohibited from assigning its allotted amount
under the party expenditure provision to a national senatorial campaign committee. See
Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31
(1981).
46. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2314.
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with" the general election of a federal candidate.47 Additionally, the
CRFCC filed a counterclaim, arguing that the party expenditure pro-
vision was facially unconstitutional because it violated the First
Amendment guarantees of free speech and association.4 s
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
concluded that the expenditures were in fact coordinated. 49 Relying
on both earlier Supreme Court precedent and the FEC's authority as
primary interpreter of FECA, the district court asserted that under
the current regulations political parties were incapable of making
independent expenditures." Under the Court's interpretation, any
expenditure by a political party made "in connection with" the elec-
tion of a federal candidate is subject to the statutory limits.5
Consequently, the district court held that § 441a(d)(3) did not apply
to the radio advertisements because expenditures are made "in con-
nection with" a candidate's election only when they constitute
"express advocacy. 5 2  Such expenditures would include words or
phrases like "vote for," "elect," "Smith for Congress," or similar
terms,53 none of which appeared in the text of the CRFCC's adver-
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839
F. Supp. 1448, 1453 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 2309 (1996).
50. See id.; see also infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court decision and FEC advisory opinions rejecting political parties' ability to make inde-
pendent expenditures).
51. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 1454; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (stating that expenditure limits apply only to messages of
express advocacy); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 (same); Federal Election Comm'n v. Furgatch,
807 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). The district court defined "advocacy" as speech
constituting a clear plea for action. See Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1455 (citing
Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 864). The FEC urged the court to accept a broader definition of the
"in connection with" language. See id. at 1454. The Commission cited FEC advisory
opinions which stated that expenditures are made in connection with an election where
they depict "a clearly identified candidate" or convey an "'electioneering message.'" Id.
(quoting FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-14, 2 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH)
5819, at 11,185); see also Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 59 F.3d 1015, 1023 (10th Cir. 1995) (characterizing expenditures as those which
"'question or challenge the candidate's statements, position, or record'" (quoting FEC
Advisory Opinion 1984-15, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) T 5766, at 11,069
(May 31, 1984))), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
53. See Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1455; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44
n.52 (stating that the use of such terms constitutes express advocacy). But see Furgatch,
807 F.2d at 863-64 (rejecting the use of "magic words" as a requisite for express advocacy,
and instead implementing a three-part test to evaluate whether a message, read as a
whole, constitutes express advocacy).
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tisements 4 Having resolved the controversy on statutory grounds,
the district court dismissed the CRFCC's First Amendment-based
counterclaim as moot.
55
On appeal, the district court's judgment was reversed.5' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found no
authoritative definition of the "in connection with" language in the
51
context of the party expenditure provision. It consequently ac-
cepted the FEC's broader definition58 and held that the statute
applied to the radio advertisements.5 9 The Tenth Circuit then ad-
dressed and rejected the CRFCC's claim that the statute violated its
First Amendment rights of free speech and association.6 Because
political party expenditures could potentially have corruptive effects
on federal elections,61 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the govern-
ment's interest in limiting those expenditures was sufficiently
compelling to justify some infringement of a political party's First
54. See Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1455; see also supra note 37 (quoting the
text of the advertisements). The district court stated that the advertisements, at best, dis-
suaded voters from supporting Timothy Wirth's candidacy; it was an indirect plea not
rising to the level of specific action. See Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1455.
55. See Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1457.
56. See Colorado Republican, 59 F.3d at 1023.
57. See id. at 1021. The district court also found no "controlling or persuasive"
authority defining the language used in § 441a(d)(3). See Colorado Republican, 839 F.
Supp. at 1453. The definition relied on by the district court was taken from earlier Su-
preme Court decisions that interpreted the phrase "in connection with" in the context of
§ 441b(b)(2), a provision of FECA dealing with contribution and expenditure limits on
corporations, banks, and labor organizations. See id. To justify its use of that definition,
the district court employed general rules of statutory interpretation which assumed that
identical terms used in separate but similar parts of the same act have the same meaning.
See id. (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); Sorenson v. Secretary of Treas-
ury of the United States, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986); Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549,
554 (10th Cir. 1987)). The Tenth Circuit maintained, however, that the terms did not nec-
essarily have similar meanings because (1) the legislature had incorporated "express
advocacy" into the definition of independent, but not coordinated, expenditures; and (2)
FECA's different treatment of parties, persons, and multicandidate committees evidenced
a possible difference in the application of the "in connection with" language. See Colorado
Republican, 59 F.3d at 1021.
58. See supra note 52 (discussing the FEC's definition of "in connection with").
59. See Colorado Republican, 59 F.3d at 1022-23. In applying the broader definition,
the Tenth Circuit considered the statute applicable because the advertisements named
"both a clearly identified candidate and contained an electioneering message." Id. at
1023.
60. See id. at 1023-24.
61. The Tenth Circuit deferred to the legislative branch on the issue of whether party
expenditures could corrupt federal elections. See id. at 1024 ("The members of Congress
who enacted this law were surviving veterans of the election campaign process ... [and
were] uniquely qualified to evaluate the risk of ... [actual or apparent] corruption from
large coordinated expenditures by political parties.").
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Amendment rights.62
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the judgment
6316of the court of appeals. Writing for the plurality,6 Justice Breyer
first observed that because the advertisements were developed and
approved solely by the Party Chairman, read only by the Party's ex-
ecutive and political directors, and discussed at meetings attended
only by Party staff, the expenditures were not coordinated, but inde-65
pendent. Although Justice Breyer recognized the government's
substantial interest in safeguarding the electoral process from the
evils of corruption, he stated that this interest was not sufficiently
66compelling to justify limits on independent expenditures. Such
limits intrude upon core First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association and significantly interfere with the ability to disseminate
67
one's political ideals.
Justice Breyer rejected the FEC's contentions that all party ex-
penditures are coordinated as a matter of law and asserted that the
evidence set forth by the FEC supporting such a presumption could
not be construed as a factual determination that political parties were
incapable of making independent expenditures. He did not address
62. See id.
63. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
64. Justice Breyer was joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter. See id. at 2312. Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote a separate opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
joined. See id. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia joined as to Parts I and III. See id. at 2323 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which Justice Ginsburg joined.
See id. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 2315. Having decided that the expenditures in question were not coor-
dinated, the Court did not need to decide whether they were made "in connection with" a
candidate's election. The debate between the Tenth Circuit and the district court there-
fore remains unresolved. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
66. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2316.
67. See id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (asserting
that expenditure limits "represent substantial ... restraints on the quantity and diversity of
political speech").
68. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2316. Moreover, Justice Breyer implied
that the existence of the evidence was more likely a result of the FEC's desire to sidestep
previous Supreme Court decisions prohibiting limitations on expenditures. See id. at 2319.
He argued that the FEC's characterization of such expenditures as being coordinated
could not justify limitations on what would otherwise be considered independent expendi-
tures. See id. Justice Breyer also rejected the argument that party expenditures were
coordinated as a matter of law because the interests of a political party and its candidates
were indistinguishable. See id. At best, he continued, the argument supports the removal
of all expenditures, for "in that case one might argue that the absolute identity of views
and interests eliminates any potential for corruption." Id.
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whether the statute was unconstitutional on its face because he found
that the issue was not sufficiently presented in the CRFCC's counter-
claim, and the CRFCC's summary judgment affidavits did not
indicate its intent to make such expenditures. 9 Although the Court
had discretionary power to consider the claim, Justice Breyer stated
that such review would be inappropriate, particularly where the con-
troversy could be resolved on statutory grounds.0
In stark contrast, Justices Kennedy and Thomas would have ad-
dressed whether the party expenditure provision was
unconstitutional on its face. Both Justices agreed that the CRFCC
had sufficiently presented the issue for the Court's consideration. 3
According to Justice Thomas, the affidavits submitted by the
CRFCC clearly addressed its desire to make coordinated expendi-
tures and indicated that it hesitated to do so only because of theS 74
existing regulations. He was critical of the plurality's reluctance to
reach the constitutional question, stating that courts regularly evalu-
ate the effects of legislation not part of the current dispute.7 1 Justice
Thomas argued that by avoiding the broader issue, the plurality un-
76
necessarily prolonged the controversy.
Although Justice Kennedy agreed that the CRFCC had asserted
a facial challenge to § 441a(d)(3), his analysis differed from that of
69. See id. at 2319-20.
70. See id. at 2320. Justice Breyer stressed the inappropriateness of reviewing com-
plex constitutional issues before they are properly briefed and argued before the Court.
See id. at 2321 ("In our view, given the important competing interests involved in cam-
paign finance issues, we should proceed cautiously, consistent with ... precedent, and
remand for further proceedings."); see also infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text
(discussing further the plurality's reluctance to address the constitutional issue).
71. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part); id. at 2323 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
72. Although Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice Thomas's arguments, he did not
join in any part of Justice Thomas's opinion. See id. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part). For purposes of presenting their arguments, however,
Justice Thomas's comments favoring the justiciability of the constitutional question should
be understood to reflect the views of Justice Kennedy as well.
73. See id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
74. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
75. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
76. See id. at 2325 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
(arguing that the only issue settled by the plurality's opinion was "whether [party] speech
is protected by the First Amendment when the government can show-presumably with
circumstantial evidence-a link between the Party and the candidate with respect to the
speech in question").
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Justice Thomas." Justice Kennedy stated that the issue presented
was a case of first impression and that past decisions had not consid-
ered the constitutionality of spending limits placed upon political
parties.78 He then argued that political parties serve a vital and
unique role in American politics by furthering the political beliefs of
their members. 79 Although Justice Kennedy conceded that political
parties have interests that "transcend" those of their candidates, "in
the context of particular elections, candidates are necessary to make
the party's message known and effective."80 Justice Kennedy as-
serted that the interests of a political party and its candidate are so
"inextricably intertwined" that the speech of the party cannot be
separated from that of the candidate "without constraining the party
in advocating its most essential positions and pursuing its most basic
goals."8' This combination of identical interests and joint First
Amendment activity between a political party and its candidate sup-
ports the conclusion that coordinated expenditure limits are
indistinguishable from the independent expenditure limits that the
Court found unconstitutional in Buckley.82
Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas found no
"constitutional significance" in the distinction between contributions
83and expenditures. Although Justice Thomas conceded that the
77. See id. at 2322-23 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Although Justice Thomas rejected the Buckley framework, he agreed that coordinated
party expenditure limits would be inapplicable even if the framework applied. See id. at
2330 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). That part of his
opinion mirrors Justice Kennedy's arguments. Compare id. at 2323 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (stating that political party speech cannot be
limited "without constraining the party in advocating its most essential positions and pur-
suing its most basic goals"), with id. at 2330-31 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the corruption rationale loses its force in the context
of political party spending because the purpose of a political party is to influence its candi-
date's views).
78. See id. at 2322 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
The Buckley Court considered whether spending limits on national or state political parties
violate either the "First, Fifth, or Ninth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment" and answered "[n]o, [only] as to the Fifth Amendment challenge ad-
vanced by appellants." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 59 n.67 (1976) (per curiam); see also
Freeman, supra note 4, at 267 ("The Supreme Court left unanswered in Buckley... how its
rationale pertains to political parties.").
79. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2322 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part).
80. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
81. Id. at 2323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
82. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
83. See id. at 2325 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Justice Thomas advocated the justiciability of the broader question in Part I of his opinion.
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equally protected, because like-minded individuals banding together
often can voice their political beliefs more effectively.00 With these
considerations in mind, the Supreme Court has stated that "the First
Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech
... ,,fI1
uttered during a campaign for political office.' An equally impor-
tant function of the First Amendment is protection of the right of
individuals to form a political party for the purposes of advancing
shared political beliefs.
102
Though the Supreme Court has recognized that First Amend-
ment rights are not absolute,' °3 where legislation infringes upon
political speech and association, the Court applies "exacting scru-
tiny."' 04  Under this standard, a statute that violates the First
Amendment cannot stand unless the government can demonstrate a
sufficiently compelling interest and that the statute is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that end.105 The Court's review of FECA in Buckley
is a good illustration of the test. In Buckley, the Court first stated
that contributions and independent expenditures are both forms of
political speech broadly protected by the First Amendment. 10 6  It
next identified a compelling government interest: the elimination of
litical processes." Mills, 384 U.S. at 218-19.
100. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,486 (1960) (noting that freedom of association
is "closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foun-
dation of a free society"); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("Effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is un-
deniably enhanced by group association ... ."); see also Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981) (recognizing the special relationship between
the freedoms of speech and association and stating that "[t]he two rights overlap and
blend; to limit the right of association places an impermissible restraint on the right of
expression").
101. Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,272 (1971)).
102. See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1237 (1996); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,487 (1975).
103. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) ("Even a 'significant
interference' with protected rights ... may be sustained if the State demonstrates a suffi-
ciently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of... freedoms."); see also Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489 (noting that the state must
have a compelling interest to justify infringement of First Amendment rights); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (same); Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488 (same). See generally
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 25
(1948) ("The First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness. It
does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in public debate ....
What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be
said.").
104. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995).
105. See id.
106. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
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corruption in federal elections.0 7 Finally, the Court evaluated
whether the government's interest was sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify the limits placed on contributions and expenditures.
In applying strict scrutiny to evaluate these limits, the Buckley
Court reached two different conclusions: It upheld FECA's contri-
bution limits but struck down limits on expenditures. 9 Although
the Court recognized that contributions and expenditures were both
forms of political speech, it found them sufficiently different to war-
rant separate treatment."O According to the Buckley Court, a
contribution is a non-specific expression of a person's political be-
liefs; although it expresses agreement with the candidate's views, it
does not specifically identify which views or seek to expound upon
those views."' Thus, limits on contributions do not significantly in-
trude on First Amendment rights because "[tihe quantity of
communication by the contributor does not increase.., with the size
of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undiffer-
entiated, symbolic act of contributing." 112 Additionally, contribution
107. See id. at 26. The Buckley Court additionally identified two "ancillary" interests,
but held that consideration of those interests was unnecessary because the prevention of
corruption was, by itself, sufficiently compelling. See id. at 25-26. One of these interests
was the need to guarantee equal influence on election outcomes to all individuals, but
"[t]he First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of free expression
cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public dis-
cussion." Id. at 49. Justice Marshall, in a separate opinion, suggested a significant
connection between excessive spending by the wealthy in federal elections and lack of
voter confidence in the integrity of that system. See id. at 288 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). If preventing the appearance of corruption is a compelling
interest, Justice Marshall's remarks may have been dismissed too readily. As one member
of the judiciary has noted, "[p]olitical inequalities stemming from disparities in wealth
have historically made Americans uneasy." J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of
Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 629 (1982).
108. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-29, 45-49; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-69 (1990) (providing an excellent example of the Court's use
of strict scrutiny in evaluating the constitutionality of contribution and expenditure limits).
109. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26,45.
110. See id. at 20-21. The Buckley distinction was upheld by a five-to-three margin;
Justice Stevens took no part in the decision. See id. at 5. Subsequently, Justice Marshall,
part of the Buckley majority, abandoned his support of that position. See Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 519 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist is the only member of the Buckley ma-
jority, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 5, still on the Court.
111. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
112. Id. But see Fleishman, supra note 4, at 869 ("It is sophistry to argue that limiting
the money one can spend on political speech is not the same thing as limiting the 'amount'
of one's political speech."). Moreover, the Court noted that limits on contributions are a
minor infringement because the speech involved is by someone other than the contributor.
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limits do not violate freedom of association because the individual is
not deprived of association with like-minded people.
13
In contrast, expenditure limits represent a "substantial rather
than merely theoretical restraint[] on the quantity and diversity of
political speech."'14  Although FECA only limits expenditures di-
rectly advocating the election of a specific candidate, the Court held
that candidate advocacy is as protected by the First Amendment as
"abstract discussion" of political issues."' Moreover, the Court as-
serted that independent expenditures do not present the same threat
of corruption as contributions because they do not necessarily aid
the candidate in winning the election, and instead may prove coun-
terproductive."6  Consequently, the Court found that the
government's interest in limiting expenditures was not as compelling
as it's interest in limiting contributions. 7
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
113. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
114. Id. at 19. "In other words, while expenditures are themselves 'speech,' and subject
to something like absolute protection in the context of an election campaign, contributions
are more nearly like 'association.' They do not express ideas but merely communicate a
solidarity between the candidate and contributor." Polsby, supra note 4, at 21; see also
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(recognizing that Buckley treated contribution limits differently because they implicated
the freedom of association rather than the freedom of speech).
115. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48.
116. See id. at 47. Although the Court implied that independent expenditures may
harm a candidate's campaign, it provided no specific examples. See id.
117. See id. at 45. In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the distinc-
tion between contributions and expenditures was logically flawed because it failed to
acknowledge that each involved the same kind of political activity as the other. See id. at
243-44 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[P]eople ... spend money
on political activity because they wish to communicate ideas, and their constitutional in-
terest in doing so is precisely the same whether they or someone else utters the words.").
Justice White also wrote a separate opinion and commented on the flawed logic of up-
holding contribution limits while simultaneously rejecting expenditure limits, since
restrictions on expenditures prevent persons from circumventing the restrictions on con-
tributions. See id. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Despite
agreeing that the distinction is not viable, Chief Justice Burger and Justice White reached
entirely different conclusions. Compare id at 241 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that both contribution limits and expenditure limits violate the
First Amendment), with id. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(urging judicial deference to the legislative branch and contending that the government
interest is sufficiently compelling to limit both contributions and expenditures); see also
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
491 n.3 (1985) (noting the different conclusions reached by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice White in Buckley). Justice White asserted that Congress has "more insight as to what
may improperly influence candidates." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). One author has suggested that Justice White's analysis may
have basis in fact because he was a member of President Kennedy's campaign. See
Wright supra note 107, at 612 ("Like the congressmen and senators-presumably more
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Two later federal election cases applied the Buckley framework
in more specific contexts, but it was not immediately clear whether
the Court was applying strict scrutiny as well.118 In California Medi-
cal Association v. Federal Election Commission,"9 the Court upheld a
FECA provision which limited the amount a person could contribute
to a multicandidate political committee. 0 The Court stated that
such contributions were not direct forms of political advocacy, but
instead were "speech by proxy"-political expression that constitu-• • • 121
tionally could be limited. The concerns raised by Justice
Blackmun, however, suggest that the majority faithfully adhered to
the distinction in Buckley between contributions and expenditures
without examining whether the contributions in dispute posed a real
or apparent risk of corruption.1
In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work
Committee,'23 the Court held that FECA's prohibition on corporate
campaign contributions to multicandidate political parties does not
violate the First Amendment.' 24 After reviewing the history of legis-
knowledgeable than most about corruption in politics-who passed the 1974 Act, and un-
like the other Justices, Justice White recognized and understood the realities of political
campaigns.").
118. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197
(1982); California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
119. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
120. See id- at 196-97. The California Medical Association ("CMA") was an unincor-
porated association of California physicians that founded the California Medical Political
Action Committee ("CALPAC"), to which they contributed an amount greater than the
$5,000 limit allowed under FECA. See id. at 185-86.
121. Id. at 201. The Court recognized that the CMA identified with the views of its
political committee, but said that "this sympathy of interests alone does not convert CAL-
PAC's speech into that of CMA." Id. at 196.
122. Justice Blackmun expressed concern for the Court's broad application of the
Buckley framework and instead argued that Buckley requires application of strict scrutiny
on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 202 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). He agreed with the outcome of the case only because multicandidate
PACs that make contributions, like the CMA, may in effect serve as conduits to candidates
and pose a legitimate risk of corruption. See id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). However, Justice Blackmun asserted that he would not
uphold the statute as applied to PACs created solely for the purpose of making independ-
ent expenditures because they would present no such danger. See id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
123. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
124. See id at 209-10. The National Right to Work Committee was a non-profit, non-
stock corporation that solicited contributions from 267,000 non-members. See id. at 200.
A corporation is prohibited from using general treasury funds to make contributions or
expenditures in connection with federal elections. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994). How-
ever, a corporation may establish a separate segregated fund "to be utilized for political
purposes," id. § 441b(b)(2)(C), if such funds are solicited from its stockholders or its mem-
bers, see id. § 441b(b)(4)(A), (C).
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lation regulating corporate spending,1'2 the Court concluded that ju-
dicial deference was warranted where federal election laws revealed
a legislative interest in the accounting of "the particular legal and
economic attributes of corporations." 2 The decision is most notable
for the Court's reluctance to apply strict scrutiny, at least in the con-
text of corporate spending. 12  According to the Court, its role was
not to "second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for
prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared."
128
The Court, however, returned to a strict scrutiny analysis of
spending limits in Federal Election Commission v. National Conser-
vative Political Action Committee.129 In National Conservative PAC,
the Court struck down a provision of the Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund Aet130 which limited a PAC's expenditures in support of
a candidate who had accepted public financing."' Even if the gov-
ernment had a sufficiently compelling interest in limiting PAC
expenditures-which the Court held it did not3--the Court con-
125. See National Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 208; see also United States v. Automobile
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570-584 (1957) (detailing the history of legislative attempts to
regulate corporate and labor union political contributions).
126. National Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 209. The Court identified two sufficiently
compelling interests underlying the FECA provisions. First, the provisions ensure that the
special economic advantage a corporation receives is not converted into a political war
chest to be used as quid pro quo in federal elections. Second, the provision aims to pro-
hibit the spending of corporate assets to support a candidate whose views are contrary to
the views of its shareholders. See id. at 207-08; Michael J. Garrison, Corporate Political
Speech, Campaign Spending, and First Amendment Doctrine, 27 AM. BUS. L.J. 163, 191
(1989).
127. See National Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 210.
128. Id.
129. 470 U.S. 480 (1985); see also BeVier, supra note 7, at 1052 (noting that the Court
reasserted strict scrutiny analysis of "corruption-prevention justifications").
130. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9002-42 (1994). Section 9012(f)(1) of the Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund Act stated:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not an authorized
committee with respect to the eligible candidates of a political party for President
and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to incur ex-
penditures to further the election of such candidates, which would constitute
qualified campaign expenses if incurred by an authorized committee of such can-
didates, in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000.
Id. § 9012(f)(1).
131. See National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 497. The National Conservative Po-
litical Action Committee ("NCPAC") was a non-profit, non-membership corporation. Its
primary purpose was to influence the election of state and federal candidates either
through contributions or expenditures. See id. at 490.
132. See id. at 497. The Court noted that there is a "hypothetical possibility" that PAC
expenditures may undermine the electoral process, but stated that "[a] tendency to dem-
onstrate distrust of PACs is not sufficient" to justify limitations on independent
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cluded that § 9012(f) was not narrowly tailored to meet that end.133
The statute applied not only to large political committees, but also to
small neighborhood organizations that clearly posed no danger of
corruption.3 The "speech by proxy" rationale used by the Court in
California Medical to justify contribution limits was distinguished; in
that case, the members of the California Medical Association
("CMA") could still spend independently to express their political
views, whereas the members of the National Conservative PAC had
no recourse because of the statute's prohibition of independent ex-
penditures. 35 The Court also distinguished the deferential approach
used in National Right to Work, stating that deference to the legisla-
tive branch was not proper where a preemptive rule
"indiscriminately lumps with corporations any 'committee, associa-
tion or organization.' ,136
An additional illustration of the Court's return to strict scrutiny
expenditures. Id. at 498-99.
133. See id. at 501.
134. See id. at 498. The Court recognized that the provision criminalized only the
spending of money to convey ideas, and not the expression of the ideas themselves, but
stated that given the expense of presenting one's views on a national scale, limiting expen-
ditures was like "allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him
the use of an amplifying system." Id. at 493. But see id. at 508 (White, J., dissenting) ("The
First Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to spend, and limitations on the
amount of money that can be spent are not the same as restrictions on speaking."); Paul A.
Freund, Commentary to ALBERT J. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 72 (1972) ("The right to speak is... more
central to the values envisaged by the First Amendment than the right to spend .... [J]ust
as the volume of sound may be limited by law, so the value of dollars may be limited
...."). See generally J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85
YALE L.J. 1001, 1019 (1976) (criticizing the Buckley characterization of campaign spend-
ing as pure speech and concluding that it is a form of conduct related to speech).
135. See National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 494-95. The NCPAC could not make
contributions because a candidate accepting public funds under the Presidential Election
Campaign Act was prohibited from accepting contributions to defray campaign expenses.
See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(d). Additionally, the speech at issue in National Conservative PAC
was not speech by proxy because the contributors and the political committee shared iden-
tical interests and the committee was expressing shared views. See National Conservative
PAC, 470 U.S. at 495.
136. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 500. The Court distinguished the deferen-
tial approach used in National Right to Work because that decision rested upon the
historical treatment of corporations under election law. See id. at 495; see also BeVier,
supra note 7, at 1084 (attributing the Court's shift in deference to its belief that preemp-
tive measures were warranted only where" 'the evil of potential corruption had long been
recognized'" (quoting National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 500)). The case was also
distinguishable from First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), because the Court
never considered whether a corporation could be prohibited from making independent
expenditures. See National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 495-96; see also infra notes 142-
48 and accompanying text (discussing Bellotti).
1997] CAMPAIGN FINANCING 1869
analysis of spending limits is its decision in Federal Election Commis-
sion v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc.137 In that case, the Court
held that restrictions on corporate expenditures expressly advocating
the election of a specific candidate do not apply to non-profit, non-stock .. 138
stock corporations. The Court held that FECA burdened speech
by forcing non-stock corporations to establish a separate, segregated
fund that involved substantial administrative responsibilities too
burdensome for small corporations to bear.139 Consequently, the
regulations infringed the First Amendment fights of the Massachu-
setts Citizens For Life ("MCFL") by discouraging the express
advocacy of its political beliefs. 140 The Court concluded that because
MCFL was created only to express specific political views, did not
pay dividends to any persons, and was not formed by another corpo-
ration or labor union, the contributions did not present a threat to
141the integrity of the electoral process.
137. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
138. See id. at 263. Massachusetts Citizens For Life ("MCFL") used treasury funds to
distribute a "special edition" publication endorsing pro-life candidates. See id. at 241-43.
FECA prohibits corporations from using assets to make expenditures "in connection with"
federal elections. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994).
139. See Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 253-56.
140. See id. at 255.
141. See id. at 264. In corporation cases, the Court has expressed concern over the use
of political war chests amassed as a result of the economic privileges enjoyed by corpora-
tions. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. See generally Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990) (discussing the specific benefits given
to corporations by states). But the MCFL "was formed to disseminate political ideas, not
to amass capital. The resources it has available are not a function of its success in the eco-
nomic marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace." Massachusetts
Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 259. The Court noted that the MCFL did not even accept
contributions from other corporations or labor unions. See id. at 264. In distinguishing
traditional corporations from the MCFL, the Court stated: "We have consistently held
that restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on
independent spending." Id. at 259-60. However, this is not entirely accurate. While the
justification is the same, the difference is that the speech sought to be protected was indi-
rect speech by proxy. See California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S.
182, 202 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(disagreeing that the Buckley decision rests on "the premise that the First Amendment
test to be applied to contribution limitations is different from the test applicable to expen-
diture limitations").
The holding in Massachusetts Citizens For Life was subsequently limited by the
Court's decision in Austin. Austin involved the Michigan Chamber of Commerce
("MCC"), a non-profit corporation consisting of 8,000 members, three-quarters of which
were for-profit corporations. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 656. The MCC sought to use general
treasury assets to make both contributions and expenditures in connection with the elec-
tion of a state candidate. See id. A Michigan statute, however, prohibited the MCC from
doing so. See id. at 655. Relying on the Court's decision in Massachusetts Citizens For
Life, the MCC argued that the statute was not applicable to non-profit corporations. See
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The Supreme Court is not only concerned with a person's right
to speak, but has displayed equal concern with that person's right to
hear.142 In First National Bank v. Bellotti, 43 the Court struck down a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporate expenditures made in
connection with referenda unrelated to the economic interest of the
corporation.1" The Court rejected the notion that a state's interest in
preventing corruption was applicable to referenda, and stated that
there was no evidence that corporate participation in such debates
had any significant coercive effects on their outcome. 14 Bellotti was
premised on the inherent societal value of political speech, the very
purpose of which is to provide greater access to information on a
wider range of political issues. 4' The Court stated that this kind of
speech is essential to the democratic process and is not less valuable
merely because it comes from a corporation rather than an individ-
ual.1 47  Ultimately, the Court protected corporate speech "not
because the corporation has a right to participate in the political
process ... but rather because the public has a right to hear corpo-
id. at 661. However, the Court construed the precedent narrowly and distinguished the
MCC from the MCFL on three grounds: First, the MCC was formed in part to conduct
ordinary business purposes, including training and education of its members and the dis-
semination of social, civic, and economic information. See id. at 662. Second, corporate
members with political views contrary to those advocated by the MCC might be reluctant
to revoke their memberships and deprive their businesses of the non-political benefits of
associating with other members of the business community. See id. at 663. Finally, unlike
the MCFL, the MCC's relationship with for-profit corporations was such that the MCC
could be used by those corporations as a means to circumvent the statute. See id. at 664.
142. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see also Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,297-99 (1981) (relying on Bellotti to strike
down an ordinance limiting contributions of committees supporting or opposing ballot
measures); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533, 541-42
(1980) (overturning a regulation prohibiting public utility companies from placing inserts
regarding public issues in their monthly bills).
143. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
144. See id. at 767-68.
145. See id. at 789-90. The Court expressly reserved the question of whether that in-
terest would be sufficiently compelling if evidence proving corruption was presented. See
id. at 789.
146. See Garrison, supra note 126, at 163, 181 (noting that the Bellotti decision is
"premised on the capacity of political ideas and thought to provide the public with the
information necessary for intelligent decisions in the democratic process"); see also Lillian
R. BeVier, Justice Powell and the First Amendment's "Societal Function". A Preliminary
Analysis, 68 VA. L. REV. 177, 188-201 (1982) (discussing Justice Powell's distinction in
Bellotti between "a process protective, societal function and an individual rights approach
to the first amendment").
147. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 ("The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source .... "); see
also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 653, 657 (1990) (noting that
corporate political speech is protected under the First Amendment).
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rate opinions.' 48
On at least two occasions the Supreme Court has relied on Bel-
lotti's process-protective rationale to invalidate governmental
attempts to regulate the internal operations of political parties. 49  In
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,1 50 the Republican Party
of Connecticut promulgated a rule allowing independent voters to
vote in Republican primaries." A Connecticut statute, however,
prohibited unregistered members from voting in a party's primary.52
The Court reaffirmed the validity of a state's interest in "'fostering
informed and educated expressions of the popular will in a general
election,' "'5' and agreed that a political party endorsement of a can-
didate serves that purpose. However, the Court rejected the
argument that a state's interest in diminishing voter confusion was
sufficiently compelling to justify an infringement of a party's First
Amendment rights. The statute at issue violated the political
148. Garrison, supra note 126, at 181; see also BeVier, supra note 146, at 195 (asserting
that the Bellotti statute "undermined informed public decisionmaking"); John A. Gray,
Corporate Identity and Corporate Political Activities, 21 AM. BUS. L.J. 439, 442 (1984)
(positing that the societal right to know, rather than self-expression, was the principal ra-
tionale in Bellotti); Thomas R. Kiley, PACing the Burger Court: The Corporate Right to
Speak and the Public Right to Hear After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 22 ARIz. L. REV.
427, 429 (1980) (stating that Bellotti held that the public's right to receive information is a
fundamental First Amendment right); Marlene Arnold Nicholson, The Constitutionality of
the Federal Restrictions on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expendi-
tures, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 945, 958 (1980) (noting that Bellotti focused on the rights of
hearers).
149. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229
(1989) (invalidating a California statute prohibiting political parties from endorsing, sup-
porting, or opposing any candidate for nomination in the primary elections); Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1986) (overturning a Connecticut statute
prohibiting individuals from voting in a political party primary if they were not registered
with that party); Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122
(1981) (striking down Wisconsin statute prohibiting unaffiliated persons from voting in
party primaries). In Eu, the Court also struck down restrictions on party organization and
composition, holding that state attempts to regulate the internal affairs of a political party
violate freedom of association. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 229-30.
150. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
151. See id at 210.
152. See id. at 210-11.
153. Id. at 220 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,796 (1982)).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 221. The Court also found that the following state interests were not
sufficiently compelling: protection of the electoral administration process, see id. at 217-
18, curtailment of election raids by independent voters, see id. at 219, and the responsibil-
ity of party government, see id. at 222-25. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument
that the party rule allowing independents to vote at their primaries invalidated the Quali-
fication Clause. See id. at 225-29.
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party's associational freedom'56 because it deprived the party and its
members of the opportunity to broaden public participation' and to
"inform themselves as to the level of support for the Party's candi-
dates among a critical group of electors."
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,1s9
various county and state political committees challenged the consti-
tutionality of a California statute that prohibited them from
endorsing, supporting, or opposing candidates in a party primary.
160
The Court asserted that a statute prohibiting party endorsements of
candidates prevents a political party from disseminating ideas and
from expressing its agreement with a candidate's views or a candi-
date's qualifications. By silencing political parties, the statute
made it "possible for a candidate with views antithetical to those of
her party... to win its primary."'6 2 Relying on Tashjian, the Court
held that prohibitions on party endorsements infringe upon a party's
freedom of association because they prevent the party from
"promoting candidates 'at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to
common principles may be translated into concerted action, and
hence to political power in the community.' ,163 Having concluded
that the statute violated First Amendment rights, the Court found no
interest sufficiently compelling to justify the government regulation
156. See id. at 229. Justice Scalia dissented and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor. See id. at 234 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the
right of political parties to select candidates "unquestionably implicates an associational
freedom," but characterized the majority's decision as an exaggeration of that right where
it was not, as in this case, "unconstitutionally impaired." Id. at 235-36 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that independent voters do not form a meaningful "association" with political
parties).
157. See id. at 214.
158 Id. at 221.
159. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
160. See id. at 217.
161. See id. at 222-24.
162. Id. at 217; see also id. at 217-18 n.4 (noting, for example, that in 1980 "the Demo-
cratic Party's nomination for United States House of Representative[s] from the San
Diego area ... was a Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan").
163. Id. at 224 (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216); see also Brian L. Porto, The Consti-
tution and Political Parties: Supreme Court Jurisprudence and Its Implications for
Partybuilding, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 433, 449 (1991) ("The [Court] has articulated a
model of associational freedom that has greatly strengthened ... political parties' capacity
to govern themselves and to control the processes by which candidates are nominated for
public office."). But see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1743 (1993) (criticizing "the constitu-
tional attacks on party regulation on the ground that such attacks are unlikely to promote
the movement's objective of responsible party government and may often run counter to
that goal").
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on parties.' 64
The decisions in Tashjian and Eu reveal the Supreme Court's
views regarding the inherent value of political parties and the signifi-
cant role they play in American government,'6 a value that Congress
itself, in the context of federal elections, recognizes and shares.'66
The Court's increased protection of political parties, combined with
its growing disregard for campaign spending limits, has led a large
minority of Justices to conclude that there exists no sufficiently com-
pelling government interest that justifies limits on party
expenditures.'67 Although Colorado Republican reaffirmed the dis-
tinction between contributions and expenditures, the strength of the
Buckley framework was undermined and its validity is questionable,
168
especially in the context of political party spending.
An additional, but less interesting, question is whether the party
expenditure provision should apply to the expenditures made by the
CRFCC. To support the proposition that all party expenditures are
presumed to be coordinated, and thus within the scope of FECA, the
FEC cited the Supreme Court's statement in Federal Election Com-
mission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee6 9 that
"[p]arty committees are considered incapable of making
'independent' expenditures."'70 . The FEC also cited several FEC ad-
164. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 231-33. The Court also examined the statutory provisions
regulating the internal structure and composition of the political parties and concluded
that they too violated the parties' associational rights. See id. at 229.
165. The decisions strengthen political parties by providing them with the opportunity
to "facilitate debate, compromise and the effective presentation of a common viewpoint."
Porto, supra note 163, at 448. Porto contends that the Court leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of whether the Eu and Tashjian decisions are "part of a comprehensive reorientation
by the Court of its views concerning the proper scope of constitutional limitations on po-
litical parties." Id. at 449.
166. For example, in passing FECA, Congress sought to maintain the role of political
parties in federal elections, stating that a "vigorous party system is vital to American poli-
tics." S. REP. No. 93-689, at 7 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587,5593.
167. The minority includes Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 2323 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
168. See infra notes 169-253 and accompanying text.
169. 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
170. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2318 (citing Democratic Senatorial Cam-
paign Comm., 454 U.S. at 28-29 n.1). The footnote reads, in pertinent part:
Expenditures by party committees are known as "coordinated" expenditures and
are subject to the monetary limits of § 441a(d).... Party committees are consid-
ered incapable of making "independent" expenditures in connection with the
campaigns of their party's candidates. The Commission has, by regulation, for-
bidden such "independent" expenditures by the national and state party
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visory opinions ' and one federal regulation. Justice Breyer, how-
ever, characterized the footnote in Democratic Senatorial as dicta
that "purported to describe the regulatory regime as the FEC had
described it in a brief."1 73 Further, the FEC advisory opinions and
the federal regulation carried little weight because the presumption
they established was undermined by the implication in one of the
same advisory opinions that parties can make independent expendi-
tures.174 Although the party expenditure provision does not itself
distinguish between independent and coordinated expenditures, Jus-
tice Breyer considered this indicative of the legislature's intent to
limit all expenditures and found that the provision's failure to distin-
guish was not evidence of "a congressional judgment that such a
distinction is impossible or untenable in the context of political party
spending.,
175
If so, it is perhaps to Justice Breyer's credit, and Justices
O'Connor's and Souter's as well, that despite any doubts regarding
the statute's continued legitimacy they reserved judgment on the fa-
cial challenge to its constitutionality until the issue was addressed
committees.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 28-29 n.1) (citations omitted).
171. See FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-15, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH)
5766, at 11,069 (May 31, 1984) (using "coordinated" to describe the party expenditure
limits); FEC Advisory Opinion 1988-22, 2 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH)
5932, at 11,471 n.4 (July 5, 1988) (same); see also id. (stating that "coordination with
candidates is presumed and 'independence' precluded").
172. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) (1996) ("The party committees ... shall not make
independent expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of candidates
for Federal office.").
173. Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2318.
174. See id. Justice Breyer cited the same advisory opinion that the FEC used to sup-
port its position. See id. That advisory opinion stated that "[a]lthough consultation or
coordination with the candidate is permissible, it is not required." FEC Advisory Opinion
1984-15, 1 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) J 5766, at 11,069 (May 31, 1984).
The FEC argued that the advisory opinions were indicative of an "empirical judgment"
that all party expenditures were coordinated. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2318.
But the statements appearing in the advisory opinions were "without any internal or ex-
ternal evidence that the FEC means it to embody an empirical judgment (say, that parties,
in fact, hardly ever spend money independently) or to represent the outcome of an empiri-
cal investigation." Id. One commentator has noted that the FEC's presumption rested on
its belief that parties and candidates were so closely related that they "could not make
both co-ordinated and independent expenditures; that the consultation inherent in one
would preempt the lack of consultation necessary to the other." Freeman, supra note 4, at
273. Freeman states that the presumption suggests that all parties have similar relation-
ships with candidates and "ignores the very real difference in treatment by the FECA ...
of local, state and national party committees." Id.
175. Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2318; see also supra note 68 (discussing Justice
Breyer's suggestion that the FEC was seeking to sidestep Buckley and its progeny).
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appropriately by the parties. Coordinated expenditures are, in some
instances, similar to independent expenditures; in turn, however,
many expenditures are indistinguishable from contributions.176 Indi-
viduals, political groups, and political action committees share some
characteristics with political parties and, consequently, "a holding on
in-fact coordinated party expenditures necessarily implicates a
broader range of issues than may first appear, including the constitu-
tionality of party contribution limits." Justice Breyer's strict
application of the Buckley framework is less a pronouncement of his
support for that position than it is support for judicial restraint.Justice Breyer declined to review the issue, not necessarily because
176. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2320. For example, an individual could
forego making a contribution to a candidate and instead pay for the candidate's expenses
directly. See id.
177. Id. On remand, the Tenth Circuit provided a sample of the constitutional ques-
tions raised by the CRFCC's challenge:
"For example, in what ways, if any, do coordinated expenditures by political par-
ties differ from coordinated expenditures by individuals or nonparty political
groups? In what ways are they similar? Are some party coordinated expendi-
tures more like independent expenditures than like contributions? Are others
more like contributions? ... Do the interests of candidates who run under a par-
ticular party's label necessarily coincide with the interests of the party
committees ... that make coordinated expenditures... ? Do candidates partici-
pate in soliciting funds for party committees, and if so, does coordinated spending
by party committees increase the opportunities for private contributors to the
party to obtain a quid pro quo from a candidate?"
Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 96 F.3d 471,
472-73 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Federal Election Commission's Response to Motion for
Expedited Consideration at 9-10). Justice Breyer asserted that a greater and more imme-
diate concern would be whether, if the Court struck down the party expenditure provision,
political parties could thereafter make unlimited coordinated expenditures or instead
would be subject to the same limits as other political committees. See Colorado Republi-
can, 116 S. Ct. at 2320.
178. Justice Breyer cited Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991), which stated that facial
challenges should not generally be entertained when an "as-applied" challenge could re-
solve the controversy. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2320; see also Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985) (recognizing that the First Amendment
does not require "invalidation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case
before it"). The majority opinion in Renne was written by Justice Kennedy, who was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Scalia. See
Renne, 501 U.S. at 313-14. Judicial restraint is, of course, not an uncommon position and
perhaps was best articulated by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In
Ashwander, Justice Brandeis outlined the governing rules of constitutional interpretation
and stated that "[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case
may be disposed of." Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring). But see Frederick Schauer, Ashwan-
der Revisited, 1995 SUP. Cf. REV. 71, 71-97 (questioning Ashwander's holding and
examining whether statutory construction is less aggressive than constitutional review).
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he believed the distinction between coordinated and independent
expenditures was meaningful, but because coordinated expenditures
as defined by FECA did not encompass the advertisements pur-
chased by the CRFCC.179 However, Justice Breyer also believed that
identical interests between a political party and its candidate support
the removal of coordinated expenditure limits.180 This position is
compatible with Justice Kennedy's arguments,8 and is a possible
indication of the decision Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Souter
may have reached had they decided the broader question."8 "
The basic philosophical difference separating Justice Kennedy's
opinion from the opinions of Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens was
that Justice Kennedy found no distinction between independent and
coordinated party expenditures but apparently held that both are
distinguishable from party contributions. 3 Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion rests on the assertion that the speech of a political party is so
"intertwined" with the speech of its candidate that application of
strict scrutiny and the Buckley framework to limits on party expendi-
tures cannot be overcome by any governmental interest. He
179. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2315; see also supra note 30 and accompa-
nying text (defining "coordinated expenditure"). In contrast, Justice Breyer implied that
Justice Thomas argued for an expedient resolution to the controversy simply because the
Court had an opportunity to resolve it, rather than the means to resolve it wisely. See
Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2321.
180. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2319; see also Freeman, supra note 4, at 289
("If a party is incapable of acting independently from its candidates, is there necessarily
the danger of corruption or the appearance of corruption that there is for individuals and
non-party associations?").
181. See infra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
182. Assuming Justice Thomas would concur, Justice Kennedy needs merely one more
vote for his position to become the majority view. In light of Justice O'Connor's positions
in earlier decisions, she seems the most likely to join Justice Kennedy. She did not object
to the Court's reasoning in Massachusetts Citizens For Life, which struck down spending
limits on corporations, and was a member of the majority in National Conservative PAC.
See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 265
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 482 (1985). Ad-
ditionally, Justice O'Connor joined the majority in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 215 (1989). And although she joined Justice Scalia's dissent in
Tashjian, that opinion did not reject the majority's characterization of a political party's
rights under the First Amendment. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S.
208, 235-36 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 150-58 and accompanying
text (discussing Tashjian).
183. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part).
184. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Justice
Kennedy noted that precedent had only examined contribution limits on individuals and
associations, and the Court had yet to apply the weight of these decisions to political par-
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argued that political parties play a unique role in facilitating
" 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'" debate on political issues.)
According to Justice Kennedy, one function of a political party is to
identify individuals who collectively represent the interests of the
party, limit the party to those individuals, and thereafter voice its
collective interest by advocating the election of a candidate. 11 6 Thus,
Justice Kennedy reasoned, political parties seek to elect a candidate
who will advance their political ideals, and coordinated party expen-
ditures are the basis for a party's support of its candidate.18  It
follows that little difference exists between whether the candidate or
the party finances the campaign because the party's speech is so
"inextricably intertwined" with its candidate's speech that the party-
coordinated expenditures become "indistinguishable in substance"
118from the candidate's expenditures.
Justice Kennedy's analysis is thus a pure application of the
Buckley test, balancing First Amendment freedoms against a com-
pelling governmental interest."' Because Buckley invalidated
ties. See id. at 2322 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see
also supra note 78 and accompanying text (characterizing Colorado Republican as a case
of first impression).
185. Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2322 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
186. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also
David Adamany, Political Finance and the American Political Parties, 10 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 497, 500-05 (1983) (examining four political party activities that support the
democratic process). Adamany states that political parties structure the vote and promote
public awareness of political issues, reduce fragmentation of interests, "[recruit] political
leaders," and "govern either by suppressing conflict and thus promoting stability or by
formulating clear alternatives and converting them into public policy." Id. at 505; see also
Larry J. Sabato, PACs and Parties, in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY: RE-
FORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 187, 193-96 (Margaret Latus Nugent &
John R. Johannes eds., 1990) [hereinafter MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY]
(discussing the purposes served by American political parties).
187. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part).
188. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Justice Ken-
nedy recognized that in most cases party expenditures will be coordinated, but argued that,
given the mutual interests between party and candidate, there is a greater justification for
invalidating political party expenditure limits. See id. at 2322-23 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment and dissenting in part).
189. See id. at 2322-23 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy did not expressly invoke the Buckley test, but he clearly applied the same
formula. His opinion emphasized the value of political debate that is protected by the
First Amendment, identified the commonality of interests between parties and their candi-
dates, argued that as a result party contributions and party expenditures are
indistinguishable, and therefore concluded that the First Amendment prohibits any limita-
tions. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); cf.
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expenditure limits on candidates, it also invalidated limits on coordi-
nated expenditures.9 ' The opinion, however, is somewhat
perplexing; by collapsing the distinction between independent and
coordinated party expenditures, it becomes difficult to justify up-
holding party contribution limits.19' Because FECA considers
coordinated expenditures to be contributions," if limits on the coor-
dinated expenditures of a political party violate the First
Amendment, contribution limits must be equally unconstitutional.'93
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy suggested in dicta that Congress could
in fact regulate party contributions. 4 By comparison, Justice Tho-
mas applied the Buckley test and also failed to find that the
government's interest in eliminating corruption sufficiently justified
placing limits upon political parties; unlike Justice Kennedy, how-
ever, he expressly extended his conclusion to apply to all limits,
including those on contributions 95 Ultimately, Justice Kennedy's
opinion can only be understood as an argument for removal of all
limits on party spending.
The consequence of this conclusion is that political parties will
be able to expend more funds on behalf of candidates, and arguably
may do so more effectively."' Commentators have generally recog-
California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 202 (1981) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (advocating the use of a "rigorous
standard of review" for election spending rather than application of general principles
derived from Buckley). Application of an ad hoc test is consistent with the Court's deci-
sions following Buckley. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 657-66 (1990); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 251-63 (1986); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-95 (1978). But see
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982)
(deferring to the legislature's determination of the need for preemptive bans on corporate
spending in federal elections).
190. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part).
191. Justice Breyer recognized the potential for this problem and explained that it was
one reason why he declined to decide the constitutional question. See id. at 2320.
192. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994) ("[E]xpenditures made by any person in
cooperation, consultation, or concert, with ... a candidate ... shall be considered to be a
contribution .... ).
193. The Court in Buckley equated coordinated expenditures with contributions and
held that limits on both were constitutional. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1976)
(per curiam).
194. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part) ("Congress may have authority ... to restrict undifferentiated
political party contributions which satisfy [the Buckley criteria], but that type of regulation
is not at issue here.").
195. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
196. See Nahra, supra note 2, at 86-87.
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nized the declining role of political parties in the electoral process,' 97
while at the same time acknowledging the value of political parties in
aggregating multiple interests and disseminating political views.1 9 If
one accepts the premise that a party does not present a threat to the
integrity of the electoral process because a party has "no intrinsic
existence outside of its candidates ... [and] can fulfill its goals and
express its opinions only through its candidates,"'99 then unlimited
party spending can serve to limit the dangers posed by other political
groups. This is because the use of party funds "reduces the candi-
date's dependence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts
the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which the
Act's contribution limitations are directed., 20 0 Political parties differ
from other political groups in that they serve multiple purposes and
are not "ideological or narrowly bound to specific views. ' '20 Freeing
political parties from FECA limits allows them to pursue those ends
that are a fundamental aspect of American politics. 02 Therefore, if a
candidate is elected as a result of party financing, and thereafter ad-
vocates that party's political views, "that is not corruption; that is
successful advocacy of ideas in the political market-place and repre-
197. See Adamany, supra note 186, at 505-15 (examining the causes of and cures for
party decline); Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties and Political Action Committees: Two Life
Cycles, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 445, 446-59 (1980) (discussing political parties' "golden age,"
their subsequent decline, and factors contributing to that decline); see also ALEXANDER,
supra note 4, at 196 (listing causes of the decline of parties other than federal election
reform). Herbert Alexander and Brian Haggerty note elsewhere that there are conflicting
views as to whether FECA was a contributor to party decline. See HERBERT E. AL-
EXANDER & BRIAN A. HAGGERTY, THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT: AFTER
A DECADE OF POLITICAL REFORM 91-93,96 (1981).
198. See Sorauf, supra note 197, at 462-63; cf. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 265 ("Too
many ideas of value to society would get lost without the organized participation of groups
in electoral politics."). The value of political parties in disseminating political issues has
already been recognized by the Supreme Court. See supra notes 149-66 and accompanying
text (discussing Tashjian and Eu).
199. Nahra, supra note 2, at 102.
200. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976) (per curiam); see also Nahra, supra note 2,
at 109 (arguing that removal of political party spending limits will decrease a candidate's
reliance on PACs).
201. Nahra, supra note 2, at 106.
202. See icL at 109; see also supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing purposes
of political parties). Adamany asserts that FECA is not directly responsible for the de-
cline of political parties; however, campaign finance laws have indirectly allowed other
"institutional competitors" to injure parties. See Adamany, supra note 186, at 563 ("The
constitutionally mandated opportunity for ideological PACs to make unlimited independ-
ent expenditures gives them a competitive advantage over parties."). However, one
should remember that the lack of limits on political action committees was a result of the
Buckley decision and not an act of Congress.
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sentative government in a party system., 203
In his reluctant application of the Buckley framework, Justice
Thomas argued that the government could not limit a party's coordi-
nated expenditures. 204 But unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas
expanded his analysis and argued that all spending limits violate the
First Amendment.2° However, it is difficult to justify his rejection of
the Buckley framework as a whole. Justice Thomas not only failed to
recognize the substantive difference between contributions and ex--• 206
penditures; 6 he also misapplied the strict scrutiny test, both by
asserting that the government's interest must be protected by the
least restrictive means and by ignoring that the prevention of the
appearance of corruption is by itself sufficiently compelling to justify
spending limits. °5
Justice Thomas first attacked the Court's "speech-by-proxy" ra-
tionale, arguing that both contributions and independent
expenditures involve an intermediary2°9---"some go-between that fa-
cilitates the dissemination of the spender's message.,
210
Additionally, he contended that contributions show more than gen-
eral support and, like expenditures, are a valuable form of political
expression.21' However, his first assertion fails to undercut the
"speech-by-proxy" rationale because the existence of a "go-between"
does not diminish that person's control over the content of the politi-
cal message, whereas contributors surrender any such control once
212they make the contribution. Moreover, the Court has never de-
nied that a contribution is a valuable political message; rather, it has
203. Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2331 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part); see also Freeman, supra note 4, at 290 ("The intent of most politi-
cal activists and political associations is to influence the official acts of elected officials. In
this effort the distinction between 'influence' and 'undue influence' is not very clear.").
204. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2330-31 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
205. See id. at 2328-29 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part),
206. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
209. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2327 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part).
210. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). By "go-
between," Justice Thomas means, for example, "an advertising agency or a television sta-
tion." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
211. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
212. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1976) (per curiam) (distinguishing be-
tween expenditures "controlled" by "would-be contributors," and those "controlled by or
coordinated with [a] candidate").
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held that limits on contributions are only a minor infringement of
free speech because the value of the message does not increase with
213the size of the contribution. Justice Thomas is correct in recogniz-
ing that proxy speech is protected where the contributors and
candidates share similar views,214 but this only supports removal of all
political party spending limits, where mutual interests between party
and candidate are less in doubt.2 5 The removal of additional limits
on all other persons and multicandidate political committees would
ignore the reality that contributions are often made even when the
contributor does not agree with a candidate's message.2 6
However, assuming that Justice Thomas is correct in asserting
that there is no viable distinction between contributions and expen-
ditures, his strict scrutiny analysis raises further concerns. First, he
• • 217
stated that spending limits are overnclusive. For example,
§ 441a(d)(3) "indiscriminately covers the many conceivable instances
in which a party committee could exceed the spending limits without
any intent to extract an unlawful commitment from a candidate. 218
213. See id. at 20-21. But see Freeman, supra note 4, at 288 (arguing that the Buckley
rationale should not apply to political parties because "symbolic expression of support for
a candidate may be adequate for an individual or a non-party political association but it is
a hollow shell for a major political party").
214. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2327 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part) (stating that the proxy speech rationale "'is not useful ...
[where] the contributors obviously like the message they are hearing from [the] organiza-
tio[n] and want to add their voices to that message'" (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v.
National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985))). But see Cali-
fornia Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) ("[S]ympathy of
interests alone does not convert [one's] speech into that of [another].").
215. This argument may add weight to Justice Kennedy's assertion that political party
expenditure limits pose no threat to the integrity of federal elections. See Colorado Re-
publican, 116 S. Ct. at 2322 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
216. For example, some individuals and corporations currently contribute to both sides
in an election, thus ensuring political access to the winning candidate. See Vicki Kemper &
Deborah Lutterbeck, The Country Club, COMMON CAUSE, Spring/Summer 1996, at 16, 20-
23; see also FRED R. HARRIS, DEADLOCK OR DECISION: THE U.S. SENATE AND THE
RISE OF NATIONAL POLITICS 74 (1993) (noting that after defeating seven incumbent Re-
publican Senators in the 1986 general elections, all seven of the newly-elected Democratic
Senators received contributions prior to the end of the year from PACs that had contrib-
uted previously to the Republican incumbents they defeated). If preventing the
appearance of corruption is a compelling governmental interest, it may be that the mere
possibility of such corruption is sufficient to justify all contribution limits. See infra notes
223-32 and accompanying text.
217. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part).
218. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also Fed-
eral Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 253-56 (1986)
1882 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
He argued that FECA's disclosure requirements, applied in conjunc-
tion with federal bribery laws, are the least restrictive means of•" o" . 219
preventing corruption. However, it is often difficult to identify
what constitutes the least restrictive means. Several Justices have
expressed concern over the use of such terms because they are pow-
erful, yet subjective, judicial weapons that if unchecked can be used
arbitrarily to overturn otherwise valid legislation. 22' Additionally, if
all spending limits are removed it will become nearly impossible to
detect corruptive activities 22' Therefore, although disclosure laws
certainly aid in Congress's fight against corruption in federal elec-
tions, spending limits may still be justified because disclosure laws
22alone may be an insufficient means of achieving that end.
(holding that FECA expenditure limits on non-profit, non-stock corporations were overin-
clusive because they applied to smaller corporations that posed no threat of corruption).
219. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas essentially adopted the position of former
Chief Justice Burger, who in Buckley determined that the legislative means of preventing
corruption were not narrowly tailored. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 246 (1976) (per
curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his analysis, Chief
Justice Burger stated that money in federal elections presents two problems because
"money ... can buy favors ... [and] money is a less visible form of associational activity."
Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, contribution limits
do not solve the problems because they fail to reach other, equally corrupt, forms of asso-
ciation. See id. (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). An example of
such corrupt association is an "eleventh-hour endorsement by a former rival, obtained for
the promise of a federal appointment." Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). As to the second problem, Chief Justice Burger stated that disclosure require-
ments "make the invisible apparent." Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
220. See Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). According to Justice Blackmun,
"least drastic means" is a slippery slope and also the signal of the result the Court
has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not
come up with something a little less "drastic" or a little less "restrictive" in al-
most any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 233-34 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (relying on Justice Black-
mun's concurrence in Illinois Board of Elections to express a similar apprehension).
Justice Blackmun, in Illinois Board of Elections, also expressed concern over the vague
terminology of "compelling state interest": "If it means 'convincingly controlling' or
'incapable of being overcome upon any balancing process,' then ... the test merely an-
nounces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all." Illinois Bd. of Elections, 440
U.S. at 188 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
221. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28; see also Nahra, supra note 2, at 105 (stating that it
would be "very difficult for the government to prove 'corruption' aside from the most bla-
tant kinds of bribery").
222. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. In Colorado Republican, Justice Thomas argued that
even if disclosure requirements and bribery laws prove to be ineffective, Congress is still
not entitled to enforce preemptive bans on campaign spending. See Colorado Republican,
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An additional element of Justice Thomas's strict scrutiny analy-
sis merits consideration. Justice Thomas rejected preemptive bans
on all spending limits because they restrict contributions and expen-
ditures in the absence of evidence that persons are "in fact engaging,
or [are] likely to engage, in bribery or anything resembling it. '
The position is representative of recent opinions that place de-
creased importance on the government's interest in preventing the
224
appearance of corruption in federal elections. But in Buckley, the
Court stated that it was equally and independently concerned with
"the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse.",22 By requiring evidence
that the threat of corruption be " 'real, not merely conjectural,' ,,226
116 S. Ct. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). This
assertion, however, is inconsistent with the view that the First Amendment is not an abso-
lute right. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. It is also contrary to the very
purpose of strict scrutiny--determining when it is permissible for the legislature's interest
to override First Amendment freedoms. See supra note 104-05 and accompanying text.
Justice Thomas also argued that contribution limits are not justified merely because ex-
penditures are available as an alternative means to political expression. See Colorado
Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part). However, the Court has previously considered and rejected that argument. See
California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 199 n.20 (1981)
("Because we conclude that the challenged limitation does not restrict the ability of indi-
viduals to engage in protected political advocacy, Congress was not required to select the
least restrictive means. .. ."); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
223. Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas noted that the Court has accepted only the preven-
tion of political quid pro quo as a compelling governmental interest supporting
expenditure limits. See id. at 2328 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part) (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)). But see Nicholson, supra note 148, at 988 ("Although
[Buckley] used the terms 'corruption' and 'undue influence' interchangeably without de-
fining them, it seemed to include more than the quid pro quo or prearranged bribe ... 
(footnote omitted)).
224. See National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 499 (stating that "a tendency to dem-
onstrate distrust" is not sufficient to justify spending limitations); see also Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 689 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(asserting that a statute is not narrowly tailored to a government interest if it prohibits
speech merely because it has the potential to produce social harm).
225. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. In Buckley, the Court found that no reliable means to
detect actual corruption existed, yet stated that the Watergate scandal demonstrated that
the concern was not illusory. See id. at 26-27. Additionally, the Court in Citizens Against
Rent Control recognized an exception to the rule invalidating limits on First Amendment
activity where there is a "perception of undue influence of larger contributions to a candi-
date." Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1981); see
also Nicholson, supra note 148, at 988 n.187 ("The Court implied in Buckley that prevent-
ing the appearance of corruption, even when no actual corruption was likely to occur,
would establish a compelling government interest.").
226. Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2331 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
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Justice Thomas ignored the simple reality that there need not be a
prior agreement between the candidate and contributor for the latter
to gain undue access to and influence over the former."' Large con-
tributions do not only secure government appointments but are a
means of gaining access to elected officials."' Having accepted the
preservation of public confidence in the integrity of the electoral sys-
tem as a compelling governmental interest, the Court should not
necessarily invalidate spending limits because the government fails to
produce evidence of actual corruption.30 For example, if suspicions
of corrupt conduct arise from the public's increased awareness of and
concern over the growth of PACs,23' even though that corruption
may only be a hypothetical possibility, spending limits designed to
reduce the appearance of corruption should not be invalidated where
and dissenting in part) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2470
(1994)).
227. See Wright, supra note 107, at 617 (noting that a candidate, once elected, knows
his chances of reelection depend on his giving "attention and deference to the views of
those who helped him financially").
228. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). Such contributions are "motivated by the perception
that this was necessary as a 'calling card, something that would get us in the door and
make our point of view heard.'" Id. at 839 n.37 (quoting Hearings Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong. 5442 (1973) (statement of Orin
Atkins, Chairman, Ashland Oil Co.)); see also Fleishman, supra note 4, at 865-66
(identifying as a principal governmental objective "diminishing contribution-based post-
election influence"). See generally ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW
ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983) (examining the effects of money on the political system
and how the financial needs of public officials open new opportunities for special interests
to shape national policy).
229. See National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 511 (White, J., dissenting); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
230. In his dissent in National Conservative PAC, Justice White stated:
We need not evaluate the accuracy of reports of such activities .... It is enough
to note that there is ample support for the congressional determination that the
corrosive effects of large campaign contributions-not least among these a public
perception of business as usual-are not eliminated solely because the
"contribution" takes the form of an "independent expenditure."
National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 511 (White, J., dissenting).
231. Political action committees have grown tremendously since the Court's decision in
Buckley. See HARRIS, supra note 216, at 73 (reporting that PACs grew in number from
608 in 1974 to nearly 4,200 by 1990, and PAC contributions increased from $8 million to
$172.4 million between 1972 and 1988). Other scholars have noted similar increases in
PAC growth. See MEREDITH WHITING ET AL., THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM 27 (1990) (noting that PACs increased from 608 in 1974 to 4828 in
1988); Sabato, supra note 186, at 188 (reporting that PACs increased in number from 113
to 4,268 between 1972 and the end of 1988 and PAC contributions increased "almost
eighteen-fold, from $8.5 million in 1971-1972 to $151.3 million in 1987-1988"). One author
suggests that it is no coincidence that such growth is greater in highly regulated areas. See
Wright, supra note 107, at 616-17.
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those limits have a sinificant effect in restoring public confidence in
the election process.
Justice Thomas's rejection of the Buckley framework is not nec-
essarily an incorrect conclusion. However, the framework does not
fail because no distinction can be drawn between contributions and
expenditures as Justice Thomas described; rather it fails because it
lacks practical effect.23 It "blinks [at] political reality" to believe that
a candidate does not recognize and appreciate expenditures made by
a person on the candidate's behalf.23  Therefore, it seems meaning-
less to limit contributions when a person can achieve the same end
by spending on his own.235 Political reality was acknowledged to
some degree by Justice Stevens in his assertion in Colorado Republi-
can that the government's interests are sufficiently compelling to
limit all party expenditures.23' He argued that the goal of spending
limits is to prevent "attempts to undermine the policies of the
[FECA]" and indicated that he would defer to Congress, which has
"both wisdom and experience in these matters far superior to [the
Court's]." 237
232. Consider one commentator's views on the importance of limiting the appearance
of impropriety:
To emphasize appearances is, of course, to concede a major role to illusion and
emotion .... The creation of "devils" is a useful mode of social explanation for
many adults, and exorcism of these devils is an important way of re-establishing
the credibility and legitimacy of political institutions. The Supreme Court has
failed to recognize that important fact .... That failure, in turn, is one very per-
suasive reason for deference to legislative assessments of political beliefs and
appearances.
Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme Court and Campaign Finance,
3 CONST. COMMENTARY 97,120-21 (1986).
233. See Nahra, supra note 2, at 55; see also supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text
(criticizing Buckley).
234. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 510 (White, J., dissenting); Buckley, 424
U.S. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Nicholson,
supra note 4, at 342 ("The fact that lack of control will render such expenditures somewhat
less effective than contributions should not reduce the candidate's gratitude, since the
candidate will realize that his or her financial supporters are doing as much as the law
allows."); Susan G. Sendrow, Comment, The Federal Election Campaign Act and the Presi-
dential Election Campaign Fund Act: Problems in Defining and Regulating Independent
Expenditures, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 977, 985 ("The absence of coordination, i.e., independ-
ence, does not itself guarantee the absence of an improper, potentially corrupt relationship
between candidate and contributor.").
235. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ste-
vens did not expressly state that spending limits are constitutional as applied to all persons,
but his arguments clearly suggested a willingness to overturn Buckley. See id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
237. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concur-
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However, deference is not without its pitfalls. It entails trusting
legislators with the very process that has not only employed them,
but has in many ways assured them of re-election given the inherent
advantages of incumbents over their challengers. As a result of
these inherent advantages, contributors are more willing to support
incumbents because they have a better chance of winning and, there-
fore, incumbents have less difficulty amassing the capital needed to
fund a successful campaign.23' Although this may not entirely dis-
courage a challenger from running against an incumbent, it decreases
the level of competition and, consequently, the chances that the bet-
ter-funded incumbent will be unseated.21' Allowing legislators to
regulate political activity without restraint may result in further in-
equities when incumbents, seeking to secure their fortunes, shift "the
political balance of power so as [to] principally ... benefit them-
selves and their political allies. ' 241 As Justice Thomas noted, to defer
ring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Congress has more insight into election
reform because its members include "many seasoned professionals who have been deeply
involved in elective processes and who have viewed them at close range over many
years").
238. It is argued that incumbents have advantages over their challengers because of
name recognition, local and/or national reputation, media access, campaign organization,
publicly provided personnel and supplies, and a general perception of challengers as weak.
See, e.g., WHITING ET AL., supra note 231, at 25-26; Adamany, supra note 186, at 536;
Fleishman, supra note 4, at 878; L. Sandy Maisel, The Incumbency Advantage, in MONEY,
ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 186, at 119, 122; Cass R. Sunstein, Political
Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1400-03 (1994); see also
Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring
the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1134-36 (1994) (discussing the
favoritism toward incumbents shown by the current campaign finance system); Wright,
supra note 107, at 621 (arguing that challengers are deterred from entering races because
of the immense sums needed to finance a campaign under the current FECA system). One
commentator suggests that a reason political parties may not present a threat of corruption
is because "incumbency creates its own power." Freeman, supra note 4, at 290.
239. See Maisel, supra note 238, at 125 (noting that in 1986 incumbents received nearly
76% of all PAC contributions); see also Adamany, supra note 186, at 535 (stating that
political contributors support those who have a real chance of winning). Adamany argues
that if a challenger is unlikely to win, contributors may support the incumbent or choose to
not contribute at all. See id.
240. See Maisel, supra note 238, at 125-26. Maisel noted that since 1972 90% of all
members of Congress seeking re-election to the House of Representatives have retained
their office. See id. at 119. In 1988, of the 407 incumbents seeking re-election, only one
was defeated in the primaries, while only six were defeated in the general elections; the re-
election percentage for that year was 98%. See id. at 121. Maisel also reported that be-
tween 1946 and 1988, the reelection percentage fell below 90% only five times. See id. at
120.
241. BeVier, supra note 7, at 1076; see also Polsby, supra note 4, at 39 ("The power of
incumbent politicians to affect the election process in undemocratic ways is, indeed,
greater than ever .... "); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 238, at 1136 ("What is at stake
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entirely to Congress allows it to shape the electoral playing field to
its benefit and to the detriment of the electorate:
What the argument for deference fails to acknowledge is
the potential for legislators to set the rules of the electoral
game so as to keep ... potential challengers out of it ....
Indeed, history demonstrates that the most significant effect
of election reform has been not to purify public service, but
to protect incumbents and increase the influence of special
242interest groups.
It may be that the damage caused by deferring to Congress is
not sufficiently compelling to deny Congress the powers granted to it
under Article IV.24  But FECA, however comprehensive, remains
riddled with loopholes that diminish its effect in preventing the ap-
pearance and reality of corruption.2"4 An example is the "bundling
loophole," which allows PACs to escape the $5,000 contribution lim-
its by channeling its members' contributions directly to its
candidates.24 Additionally, "soft money" contributions are another
means of evading FECA limitations,246 and are seen by some as the
is the fairness of the electoral process .... ).
247- Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2329 n.9 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). Justice Thomas compared congressional
deference in the federal elections to "letting the fox stand watch over the henhouse." Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
243. See Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261,307 (1981) (arguing that incumbents resolve First Amendment issues
impartially because many First Amendment issues have little effect upon chances for ree-
lection and, further, that it is "fanciful to suppose that incumbents would often protect
their incumbency by conspiring to deny the electorate access to ... information and
ideas").
244. Ironically, the very reason FECA was passed was because its predecessor, the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, had so many loopholes that the act was rendered
"practically useless." Nahra, supra note 2, at 63 (citation omitted).
245. See HARRIS, supra note 216, at 76-77; see also Anne H. Bedlington, Loopholes and
Abuses, in MONEY, ELECrIONS, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 186, at 69, 79-81
(discussing the problems presented by the bundling loophole); Wertheimer & Manes, su-
pra note 238, at 1140-41 (concluding that, as a result of the loopholes, "PAC[s] ... get[]
the credit [for the contributions]-and the influence that flows from [them]"). Such a
loophole could be closed by "requiring that any such contributions be counted toward the
intermediary's and the original donor's limits" and by prohibiting combined contributions.
WHITING ET AL., supra note 231, at 27.
246. Fred Wertheimer and Susan Manes explain the "soft money" loophole as follows:
First, PACs, corporations, and wealthy individuals make contributions to a candi-
date's political party. Because these contributions are not made directly to the
candidate, they are not subject to the limits under current campaign finance laws.
The political party then channels this "soft money" to state political parties,
where it is spent to support the presidential campaign by financing activities such
as get-out-the-vote drives. Presidential candidates can thereby raise money,
through their political parties, that is not subject to the campaign contribution
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most pernicious threat to federal elections today. Soft money con-
tributions raise significant questions of accountability because such
expenditures are not fully disclosed and may result in political ineq-
uities that overshadow those created by traditional "hard-money"
contributions.24' The presence of such a loophole in the FECA, not
of the Supreme Court's making, is a further reason for questioning
the validity of judicial deference in regard to federal elections.
Moreover, even if FECA could be designed to preclude all possible
loopholes, it still may not prevent the danger of political quid pro
quo, "since the candidate will realize that his or her financial sup-
porters are doing as much as the law allows."' 0 Ultimately, one must
conclude that it belies political reality to believe that those with the
desire to influence political candidates, and those who possess the
necessary resources, will be unable to find a way to do so.
limits.
Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 238, at 1144-45. FECA does not prohibit "soft money"
contributions "specifically designated to defray any cost for construction or purchase of
any office facility not acquired for the purpose of influencing the election of any candidate
in any particular election for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(viii) (1994). Such
funds are supposed to go into "non-federal" accounts and should not be used to finance a
candidate's federal election campaign. See Kemper & Lutterbeck, supra note 216, at 20;
see also WHITING ET AL., supra note 231, at 19 (discussing the significance of soft money in
federal elections).
247. See Kemper & Lutterbeck, supra note 216, at 19 ("Soft money flies in the face of
all contribution restrictions .... [M]any soft money donors are giving huge sums to one or
both parties with the understanding that their contributions will win them access and influ-
ence .... "). But see Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2316 (asserting that "soft money"
contributions at best pose a minimal threat of corruption in federal elections). Of par-
ticular note are those individuals and corporations who contribute to both sides in an
election, thus ensuring political access to the winning candidate. See Kemper & Lutter-
beck, supra note 216, at 20-23; see also Adamany, supra note 186, at 535 (arguing that
"political elites [rarely] contribute resources solely from ideological motivations").
248. See David Adamany, The Unaccountability of Political Money, in MONEY,
ELECrIONS, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 186, at 95, 104.
249. See BeVier, supra note 7, at 1078 ("The historical ineptitude of legislatures at-
tempting electoral reform suggests that deference to legislative 'expertise' is unwarranted.
Example after example illustrates that political reformers have not yet figured out how to
mold political reality into conformity with their stated political vision.").
250. Nicholson, supra note 4, at 342 (footnote omitted).
251. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,265 (1976) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("One would be blind to history to deny that unlimited money
tempts people to spend it on whatever money can buy to influence an election."); see also
Sorauf, supra note 232, at 119 (stating that the Buckley Court, excluding Justice White,
"[d]espite all the arguments and stipulations... never grasped the idea of a flow of money,
which if stopped at one outlet would build up pressure at others"). Sorauf goes on to state
that the Court "betrayed some lack of sophistication about the enormous complexity of
social causation." Id. at 120; see also WHrITNG ET AL., supra note 231, at 25 (noting that
some commentators reject elimination of PACs as a possible reform because that would
"simply set clever campaign operatives to work devising new ways of raising the vast
CAMPAIGN FINANCING
Today, federal election law is in a quandary. Unless the Su-
preme Court overturns Buckley, campaign finance law will be
adjudicated within a framework that severely undermines any legisla-
tive attempt to balance the government's interest with the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association. On the other
hand, if the Buckley framework is abandoned, too much power may
be placed in the hands of the elected, which could prove as deleteri-
ous to the integrity of the electoral process as the spending Congress
wishes to regulate. In any event, without restrictions on bundling
and soft money contributions, FECA is still an inefficient means of
preventing the appearance and reality of corruption. In Colorado
Republican, a partial solution is offered. Unlimited political party
spending will strengthen the role of a political entity that is not only
essential to the political process, but also poses the least threat of
252corruption. Given Justice Breyer's implied agreement with that
solution and Justice O'Connor's positions in previous Supreme
Court decisions, it is likely that, when the Court finally considers the
issue, all spending limits imposed on political parties will be held un-
constitutional.253
Additional measures must be taken, however, if unlimited
spending is to have any effect in strengthening political parties.
Stricter spending limits must be placed on political action commit-
tees,254  and soft money contributions must be regulated.2 55
Additionally, tax credits could be enacted to provide an incentive for
persons to contribute directly to political parties and thereby lessen
256the impact of independent spending. Ultimately, one needs to rec-
ognize that there will always be factions which seek to exert
amount of money it takes to run a successful campaign").
252- See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2322-23 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
253. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (predicting future Supreme Court
alignment on election law decisions).
254. Party decline can be partially attributed to PACs because their "prominence ...
tends to pull candidates away from adherence to a party program." Adamany, supra note
186, at 549; see also Herbert E. Alexander, The Future of Election Reform, 10 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 721, 742-43 (1983) (discussing candidates' reliance on PACs, which gives
PACs "direct access to successful candidates without the mediation of a party to accom-
modate the conflicting claims of all the individuals and groups seeking to influence public
policy").
255. See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 238, at 1156 ("No campaign finance reform
will work or be publicly credible unless it shuts down the soft money system .... "). One
commentator suggests that raising limits on coordinated general election expenditures
would offset the impact of restrictions on soft money contributions. See Bedlington, supra
note 245, at 87.
256. See Polsby, supra note 4, at 40; Sabato, supra note 186, at 200-02.
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influence on those in power.2" A belief that we can eliminate special
interests in federal elections, whether those interests are representa-
tive of the electors or the elected, is misguided. At best, we can only
hope to limit the effects of those interests.2 s In the context of federal
elections, strengthening the role of political parties may not be a per-
fect solution, but it is the first step in recognizing the political
realities of campaign finance.
DAVID J. LEKICH
257. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
258. See id. at 60 ("[T]he causes of faction cannot be removed; ... relief is only to be
sought in the means of controlling its effects.").
1890 [Vol. 75
